is paper explores a designer-optimal reimbursement scheme in all-pay auctions with winner's reimbursement. Assuming the reimbursement is a linear function of the cost of e ort, we obtain analytical solutions for the contestants' symmetrical equilibrium e ort and the contest organizer's expected revenue. We show that if the e ort cost function is concave, the optimal reimbursement scheme is to return the full cost to the winner. On the contrary, if the e ort cost function is convex, the optimal reimbursement scheme is not to compensate the winner. Moreover, we nd that the organizer's expected revenue may increase or decrease as the number of contestants increases when the winner is fully reimbursed.
Introduction
It is well known that the all-pay auction (contest) is commonly used to model applications, such as political campaigns, rent seeking, R&D competitions, job promotions, etc. One of the possible solutions of eliciting higher expected revenue involves reimbursement of the contestants' e orts. Several studies contribute to the research of contestants' reimbursement in all-pay auctions.
Cohen and Sela [1] rst consider the winner's reimbursement in Tullock contest with two asymmetric players. ey show that the expected revenue is higher when the winner's cost of e ort is reimbursed than no reimbursement. Matros and Armanios [2] extend the work of Cohen and Sela [1] . ey consider Tullock contest with symmetric players and nd that the winner's reimbursement causes an increase in the expected revenue, while all losing players' reimbursement leads to a decrease in the expected revenue. Later, this model is generalized by Matros [3] and Yates [4] . Matros [3] focuses on the winner's reimbursement in Tullock contest with asymmetric players. He describes all equilibria and discusses their properties. Yates [4] analyzes the unique equilibrium of a class of two-player contests, including Tullock contests, where all the other players' costs are reimbursed except for the winner. Minchuk and Sela [5] investigate the all-pay auction with insurance, which is a form of loser reimbursement for an additional fee. More types of reimbursement in contest are studied by Kaplan et al. [6] , Baye et al. [7] , Chowdhury and Sheremeta [8] , etc.
is paper focuses on all-pay auctions where the winner's reimbursement is a linear function of the cost of e ort. Closely related to our paper, Minchuk [9] analyzes the all-pay auctions where the winner gets a full refund of his e ort. He shows that if the cost of e ort is concave, then the expected revenue of the contest organizer is higher when the winner is fully reimbursed opposed to receiving no reimbursement. However, the result is reversed if the cost of e ort is convex. is study only considers the case if the winner is fully compensated or not compensated at all. It is unclear how much reimbursement would be optimal for the organizer to pay the winner. By introducing a linear compensation function in all-pay auctions, we demonstrate that a full reimbursement for the winner maximizes the organizer's expected revenue if the cost of e ort is concave. On the contrary, no reimbursement for the winner maximizes the organizer's expected revenue if the cost of e ort is convex. e linear compensation function is also employed by Matros and Armanios [2] and Baye et al. [10] . Matros and Armanios [2] analyze the Tullock contest where the winner and the losers are all compensated and the reimbursement is a linear function of e ort. Baye et al. [10] characterize symmetric litigation environments with a simple auction-theoretic framework to compare di erent litigation systems. e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of the all-pay auctions with winner's reimbursement. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium e ort and expected revenue and shows the e ect of reimbursement and the number of participants on both of them. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Model
Consider the all-pay auctions where there are ≥ 2 risk-neutral contestants competing for a single prize. Each contestant i's value of winning is independently and identically distributed on [0, 1] according to a continuously di erentiable distribution function ( ) with a positive and continuous density function ( ), which is assumed to be commonly known. Let all the contestants share the cost of the e ort , ( ), satisfying (0) = 0 and ὔ > 0 ( is form of cost function in all-pay auctions is considered in many studies. For example, Moldovanu and Sela [11, 12] .). Denote the reverse function of ( ) by = −1 . e contestant with the highest e ort wins the prize.
If contestant with the value v i and e ort wins the prize, he also gets reimbursement which is a linear function of the cost of e ort, , where 0 ≤ ≤ 1 is a constant; if he loses, he pays his cost of e ort . It is reasonable to assume that each contestant's e ort equals zero if his value of winning is zero.
If there is a symmetric monotonically increasing equilibrium e ort function : is the probability that contestant with the value has the highest e ort among all contestants.
Main Results

e E ect of Reimbursement.
e following proposition rst gives expressions of the equilibrium e ort of each contestant and the expected revenue of contest organizer.
Proposition 1. In an all-pay auction with winner's reimbursement, (i) the equilibrium e ort of contestant is
(ii) the contest organizer's expected revenue is given by
Proof.
(i) Suppose that the symmetrical equilibrium e ort function ( ) exists and strictly increases with v. With all other contestants using ( ), as per (1) the expected function of contestant with the value and the e ort ( ) is given by where ( ) = −1 ( ) is the probability that contestant i with the value t wins. In equilibrium, the derivative of ( ) at = equals zero, i.e.,
Rearranging yields
Solving the rst order nonhomogeneous di erential equation and noting that (0) = 0, we have
Noting that = −1 and rearranging yields (2) . Now, Eq. (2) is merely a necessary condition for = to maximize ( ). Next, we claim that it is also a su cient condition. Using (4) we have
As per (7), we get Substituting (9) and (10) into (8) and simplifying, we obtain
Finally, we need to prove that is strictly increasing. In fact, since = −1 ∈ [0, 1] is strictly increasing
is strictly increasing. us, the right hand side of (7) is strictly increasing in . Hence,
Since is strictly increasing, we have
(ii) e contest organizer's expected revenue is
where the rst part is the expected revenue from all e orts of the contestants, while the second part is the expected reimbursement cost. Substituting (2) into the above equation and rearranging yields (3). e equilibrium e ort and the expected revenue in the standard all-pay auction without reimbursement (see, for example Minchuk and Sela, [5] ) are, respectively, given by or equivalently, It is easy to see that when = 0, and degenerate to and , respectively. Namely, 0 = , and 0 = . e equilibrium e ort and the expected revenue in the all-pay auction with winner's full reimbursement are (Minchuk [9] considers the all-pay auction with winner's reimbursement, in which the winner receives a full refund of his e ort in addition to the contest prize), respectively, given by or equivalently, It is clear that when = 1, , and become and , namely, 1 = , and 1 = . e following proposition explores the e ect of reimbursement on the equilibrium e ort of each participant.
Proposition 2. In an all-pay auction with winner's reimbursement, the equilibrium e ort of each contestant increases monotonically in parameter k.
Proof. Since ≥ 0, 1/ 1 − increases in parameter . Noting ∫ 0 ὔ ( ) ≥ 0 and ὔ > 0, hence increases in parameter .
Corollary 1.
In an all-pay auction with winner's reimbursement, we have
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 imply that the winner's reimbursement causes an increase in the equilibrium e ort. e higher the reimbursement the winner receives, the more e ort each contestant exerts. In particular, full reimbursement enables each contestant to exert their best e ort, namely, = 1. is nding is consistent with the result that winner's reimbursement parameter increases an equilibrium e ort in Tullock contest, see Matros and Armanios [2] . Intuitively, if the winner gets reimbursed, this increases the actual prize, and as a result, this increases the competition in the contest and therefore all the contestants exert higher e ort. e following proposition shows the e ect of reimbursement on the organizer's expected revenue.
Proposition 3. In an all-pay auction with winner's reimbursement, (i) if the e ort cost function (⋅) is concave, then the organizer's expected revenue increase monotonically in parameter ;
(ii) if the e ort cost function (⋅) is convex, then the organizer's expected revenue decrease monotonically in parameter .
Proof. (i) If the e ort cost function (⋅) is concave, it follows from ὔ > 0 and = −1 that (⋅) is convex, which implies that ὔ > 0 and ὔὔ ≥ 0. Let Di erentiating both sides with respect to yields since ( )/(1 − ( )) 2 ≥ 0, ∫ 0 ὔ ( ) ≥ 0, ὔὔ ≥ 0 and 1/(1 − ( )) ≥ /(1 − ( )). Noting that = ∫ 1 0 ℎ( , ) , we have / ≥ 0. e proof is completed.
(ii) If the e ort cost function (⋅) is convex, noting that ὔ > 0 and = −1 , then (⋅) is concave, which implies that ὔ > 0 and ὔὔ ≤ 0. e remaining proof is similar to that of part (i).
Corollary 2. In an all-pay auction with winner's reimbursement,
(i) if the e ort cost function (⋅) is concave, then (ii) if the e ort cost function (⋅) is convex, then
(20)
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 4 potential bidders under properly set mechanisms. Speci cally, they nd the functional relationship between the two variables to be single-peaked, which is consistent with the situation shown in Example 1. Remarkably, this result is inconsistent with the standard result in the contest literature stating that the expected revenue increases as the number of players increases.
Conclusion
In this study, we focus on the all-pay auction where the winner, in addition to the contest prize, is also reimbursed and the reimbursement is a linear function of the cost of e ort. We nd that no matter the e ort cost function is concave or convex, the more reimbursement the winner receives, the more e ort each contestant exerts. In particular, full reimbursement enables each contestant to exert their best e ort. If the e ort cost function is concave, the winner's reimbursement leads to a higher expected revenue than a regular allpay auction. e more reimbursement the winner receives, the more expected revenue the contest organizer gains. us, full reimbursement is the most pro table for the contest organizer. However, if the cost function is convex, the winner's reimbursement causes a decrease in the expected revenue. e more reimbursement the winner receives, the less expected revenue the contest organizer gains. In this case, having no reimbursement is the most pro table for the contest organizer. In addition, we numerically show that the organizer's expected revenue may increase or decrease as the number of participants increases when the winner is fully reimbursed. Questions that will remain for future research are, the e ect of the number of contestants on the equilibrium e ort, the expected revenue when there is no reimbursement for the winner, and the equilibrium e ort when the winner is fully reimbursed.
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e E ect of the Number of Participants.
is section we consider the two designer-optimal reimbursement schemes: the winner is fully reimbursed (i.e., = 1) and the winner receives no reimbursement (i.e., = 0). It is not clear whether the equilibrium e ort and expected revenue increases or decreases as the number of contestants increases when = 0, and if the equilibrium e ort increases or decreases as the number of contestants increases when = 1. However, the organizer's expected revenue may increase or decrease as the number of contestants increases when = 1 (see the following example). Table 1 ( e contest organizer's expected revenue is obtained by using the MATLAB so ware).
As Table 1 shows, the organizer's expected revenue increases as the number of participants increases from two to seven. However, the expected revenue decreases as the number of participants increases from seven to eight. Fu et al. [13] also nd that the expected overall bid of the contest is not monotone in the number of shortlisted (23) = 1 ≤ ≤ 0 = .
(24) 1 ( ) = − 1 1 − −1 3/2 . 
